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PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE IMPACT OF
INCORPORATING THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM
I. INTRODUCTION
The incorporation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (ECHR)1 into the
domestic laws of the United Kingdom2 has sparked heated debates,
not the least of which centers around the possibility of a common law
right of privacy being introduced through the “back door.”3 Before

1. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), reprinted in
RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 500.1 app. (2d ed.
1990) [hereinafter ECHR]. The Convention entered into force when it had been ratified by at
least ten member states. See MANUAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 263 (1970). The ECHR
will be discussed further in Part IV, infra.
2. See Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.). The Human Rights Act (Act) received the
Royal Assent on November 9, 1998. The Act incorporates the ECHR into the domestic legislation of the United Kingdom. While the Act is now officially on the statute books, it will not be
fully in force until the year 2000. See Clare Dyer, Bringing Home the Basics, GUARDIAN
(London), Nov. 12, 1998, at 21, available in 1998 WL 18676809. The eighteen month delay between the time the Act was incorporated and the year 2000, when the Act comes into force,
allows for judges and magistrates to undergo training as well as give public bodies enough time
to come into compliance with the ECHR. See id. Great Britain includes the three mainland
areas of England, Wales, and Scotland as well as several smaller islands such as the Channel
Islands. To be entirely correct, these three mainland areas and Northern Ireland in turn make
up the United Kingdom. See J. DENIS DERBYSHIRE & IAN DERBYSHIRE, POLITICAL SYSTEMS
OF THE WORLD 517-23 (2d ed. 1996). While the United Kingdom is a unitary state, there are
three separate and distinct legal systems. The English legal system comprises England and
Wales while Northern Ireland and Scotland both have their own system of laws and courts. See
KENNETH R. REDDEN & LINDA L. SCHLUETER, MODERN LEGAL CYCLOPEDIA 3.230.7 (1994).
While Scotland has a separate legal system, the Houses of Parliament at Westminster currently
operates as its legislature although some minor legislative functions are in the process of being
developed. See id. at 3.240.23. Northern Ireland, on the other hand, has its own parliament
and written constitution, though it is now heavily under British direct rule. See id. at 3.250.9,
3.250.13. The Act will be applicable throughout the United Kingdom and will become a source
of rights in all three legal systems. See Human Rights Act, supra, cls. 4(5), 22(6). While it is
important to remember that the Act will be in force throughout the United Kingdom, this Note
will focus primarily on the effect of the Act in England. Additionally, this Note will focus on
English common law and English courts.
3. See, e.g., Emma Wilkins, Press at Risk from Privacy Law, Says Wakeham, TIMES
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the ECHR was incorporated, the United Kingdom had neither a
statutory nor common law right of privacy.4 In fact, the United
Kingdom remained one of only a handful of countries without a Bill
of Rights.5
The following three cases—from different countries—offer a
striking example of the different results that may arise depending
upon whether a court recognizes a plaintiff’s right to privacy. In the
first case, the son of a famous stage actor was hospitalized in France.
Several reporters stormed the private hospital room, photographed
the nine-year-old boy, and conducted an interview.6 In the second
(London), Nov. 3, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 9240169; Michael White, No Back Door
Privacy Laws, Pledges Blair, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 12, 1998, at 8, available in 1998
WL 3078497. Both the English media and politicians have frequently ascribed the phrase
“back door” to the ongoing privacy debate. The metaphorical “front door” in this case would
be a full and open debate of a positive privacy law in both the House of Commons and the
House of Lords. The incorporation of the ECHR into the domestic law of the of the United
Kingdom has raised fears that judges, whose role would be to interpret the ECHR, will use Article 8 of the ECHR to shape a new common law right of privacy, a right which has until now
never been recognized in English jurisprudence. See James Landale & Frances Gibb, Rights
Bill is No Threat to Press, Irvine Insists, TIMES (London), Nov. 4, 1997, at 8, available in 1997
WL 9240449.
4. See PNINA LAHAV, PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
41 (1985); see also JAMES MICHAEL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 100 (1994). The history of
the right of privacy in Britain remains a sporadic affair. Attempts to introduce such a right by
positively legislating it have been considered, but these attempts by and large have failed. See,
e.g., COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY 1972, Cmnd. 5012,
¶¶ 13-16 [hereinafter Younger Report]. The Younger Committee is the most celebrated and
complete attempt to introduce a right of privacy in England. The Younger Committee nevertheless concluded that such legislation was unnecessary. See LAHAV, supra, at 41. The
Younger Committee will be discussed infra in Part III. The concept of “privacy,” as adopted
by this Note, will be discussed and defined infra Part II.
5. See MICHAEL ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS? 41 (4th ed. 1997). In the last decade
alone, a number of countries have adopted a Bill of Rights. For instance, New Zealand
adopted a Bill of Rights in 1990, see Bill of Rights Act (1990) (N.Z.); Hong Kong in 1991, see
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinance, ch. 383 (1991); Israel adopted a
Basic Law in 1992, see Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391; and South Africa adopted a bill of rights in 1993 as part of its new constitution, see S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2.
6. See Cass. 2e civ., July 12, 1966, D.S. Jur., 1967, 181 (Fr.). The young boy, Oliver
Philipe, was the son of the well-known, and deceased, French stage actor Gerard Philipe. The
defendant, France-Dimanche, advertised the sale of their upcoming scoop throughout the
country and was intent on releasing the article and photographs in their weekly magazine. The
lower court, frowning on the actions of the reporters, ordered the removal of all advertising and
seized all the copies of the magazine. The court of appeals affirmed, and found that there was
“an intolerable intrusion into the private lives of the Philipe family” which clearly warranted
the injunction. See id. This exacting remedy was made possible by France’s robust privacy law,
found in Article 9 of the Civil Code. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 9 (Fr.). This article states in
part: “[e]ach person has the right to have his privacy respected. Judges are entitled, independently from the award of damages, to prescribe any measure, such as sequestration, seizure, or
any other measure necessary to prevent violation of the intimacy of private life. . . .” Law No.
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case, a woman in the United States was hospitalized with a severe
and unusual eating disorder. A reporter broke into her hospital
room, took pictures, and ultimately printed her story in a nationally
published magazine.7 In the third case, a well-known actor was hospitalized in England after having been treated for a severe head injury.
While the semi-conscious patient was recovering, journalists ignored
several restricted entry notices on the door, conducted an interview,
and took several pictures of the patient.8
While the factual similarities in these cases are striking—
notably, none of the patients had consented to the media intrusion—
only in the first two cases were the plaintiffs granted relief for the invasion of their privacy.9 In the third case, the English Court of Appeal discharged the lower court’s injunction enjoining publication,
and regretfully informed the plaintiff that English law does not recognize a right of privacy. The court nonetheless urged legislative action to give that “breadth of protection”10 necessary for a plaintiff
70-643 of July 17, 1970, J.O., July 19, 1970, p. 6751; 1970 D.S.L. 200 (Fr.), translation in LAHAV
supra note 4, at 171. See generally Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The
Warren & Brandeis Tort is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1219, 12191301 (1994) (discussing in detail the right of privacy in France).
7. See Barber v. Time Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942). The magazine published its story
and pictures above such captions as “Insatiable-eater Barber” and “She eats for ten.” Id. at
293. The State of Missouri had recognized the right of privacy in an earlier case. See Munden
v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911). In Barber, the court stated that liability exists if
“the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency. . . . These limits are exceeded where intimate details of the life of one who has never manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed
to the public, or where photographs of a person in an embarrassing pose are surreptitiously
taken and published.” Barber, 159 S.W.2d at 293-94. The court went on to affirm the jury’s
award of actual damages and denied Time’s First Amendment defense. Id. at 295. But see discussion infra note 9.
8. See Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R 62 (Eng. C.A.). Kaye is the seminal Court of Appeal case addressing the need for a privacy law in Britain. The judges, individually, all make a
strong case for such a right, going as far as urging legislative action and citing with approval the
American inception of and experience with this right. See id. at 71 (Leggatt, L.J.). Kaye, a famous television actor, suffered a severe head accident when a piece of wood came loose from
an advertising billboard and crashed through his car’s windshield. See id. at 63 (Glidewell,
L.J.). He was subsequently on life support for three days in the intensive care unit and was
moved nine days later to a private room. See id. The court acknowledged that since there had
been no trespass to the person, libel, or passing off, there was no remedy to vindicate Kaye’s
right of privacy. See id. at 66. This case will be discussed further in Part III, infra.
9. In light of recent, though sparse, Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence, it is unlikely
that Barber would today be able to recover damages against Time’s publication of these private
but true facts. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). The Florida Star decision is discussed in Part II. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. Today, it is likely Barber’s only
cause of action would be for intrusion. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
illus. 1 (1977).
10. Kaye [1991] F.S.R. at 70 (Bingham, L.J.).
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faced with such “a monstrous invasion of his privacy.”11
This Note will examine the incorporation of the ECHR into the
domestic law of the United Kingdom and analyze how this move may
affect the delicate balance between the right of the press to publish
truthful information and the individual’s right to privacy. Part II will
briefly canvass the origins of the right of privacy in the United States
and delineate the discrete area of privacy this Note addresses. Part
III will explore the shortcomings of the United Kingdom’s civil laws
in bridging what some believe is a troubling privacy gap. Finally, Part
IV will describe the process of incorporation in the United Kingdom,
its effect on the press and non-governmental actors like the Press
Complaints Commission, and the likelihood that English judges will
ultimately be able to tip the balance in favor of a right of privacy—a
right that judges have thus far been unable to acknowledge directly.
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will be
examined to supplement this latter analysis in an attempt to gauge
how this body has weighed the competing interests of privacy and
free expression. Ultimately, this Note will conclude that the incorporation of the ECHR into the domestic laws of the United Kingdom
will not lead to greater privacy protection in most cases. Instead, a
plaintiff whose privacy has been invaded by the private media would
best be protected through expansion of an existing common law remedy and a recent legislative enactment.
II. PRIVACY CONFINED
The American experience with privacy offers both an apposite
backdrop and starting point for defining the contours of the privacy
rights since the right first took root in this country. Moreover, this
initial focus reveals a striking irony: while the famous article by Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,12 claimed that there was an
11. Id. (quoting Bernstein v. Skyviews Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 479, 489G (Griffiths, J.)).
12. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890). This article both inspired and outlined the right to privacy in the United States.
See RAYMOND WACKS, PRIVACY AND PRESS FREEDOM 10 (1995). One commentator has
gone as far as saying that the article did “nothing less than add a chapter to our law.”
ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1956). The inspiration for the article
was once believed to have been sparked by Warren’s outrage of press coverage of his daughter’s wedding. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960). More recent
investigation, however, has revealed that the driving force behind the article most likely was
motivated by press criticism of Warren’s father-in-law. See James H. Barron, Warren and
Brandeis, the Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation,
13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 904-07 (1979) (revealing that Warren’s daughter was only nine at
the time). The article was so compelling that two years later the State of Georgia, followed by
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implicit common law right of privacy in the United States—a conclusion supported entirely on English case law13—English jurisprudence
has never recognized such a right.14
“Privacy” is an amorphous legal concept.15 In its most basic
form, the right of privacy can be defined as the “right to be let
alone.”16 The American Law Institute’s Restatement (First) of Torts
provides that: “[a] person who unreasonably and seriously interferes
with another’s interest in not having his affairs known to others or his
likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.”17 Drawing inspiration from Warren and Brandeis, Dean Prosser refined the single
tort of invasion of privacy into “a complex of four.”18 These four
relatively discrete torts are: “(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”19 Today in the United States, at least twenty-eight states have
adopted this four-fold division of privacy20 and almost all states have
recognized an invasion of privacy tort in at least some form.21 Despite this seemingly widespread recognition, invasion of privacy ac-

fourteen other states, recognized a common law right of privacy. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1904). In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals rejected
the Warren and Brandeis argument and refused to recognize a common law right of privacy.
See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). The New York legislature later passed such a law. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (1948).
13. See, e.g., Prince Albert v. Strange, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849) (Warren and Brandeis relied heavily on this English case).
14. Kaye [1991] F.S.R. at 66 (Glidewell, L.J.); see also Malone v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1984), where the Court of Appeals effectively closes the door on a
common law right of privacy, leaving it up to Parliament to legislate in this area.
15. See RAYMOND WACKS, THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 10-13 (1980); see also Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Autonomy, Community, and Traditions of Liberty: The Contrast of British and
American Privacy Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1398, 1401.
16. THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
17. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
18. Prosser, supra note 12, at 383, 389.
19. Id. at 389. But cf. Edward J. Blounstein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 962-64 (1964) (criticizing Prosser’s “mistaken”
theory that “privacy is not an independent value”). Prosser’s delineation was adopted by the
American Law Institute in their second restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652A-D (1977).
20. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of
Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 984, 998 n.41 (1995).
21. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at
851 (5th ed. 1984).
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tions in the United States have not been particularly successful.22 In
particular, where media defendants are involved, the American guarantee of free expression, encapsulated in the First Amendment,23 has
often proved an obstacle too great to overcome. For example, the
Supreme Court has on four occasions addressed the issue of whether
truthful speech could be invasive of privacy. In each case, the Court
found for the media defendant.24
For purposes of this Note, “privacy” will be limited to what
Dean Prosser describes as the tort of intrusion and the tort of public
disclosure.25 The two torts are similar in that both require the disclo22. See McClurg, supra note 20, at 996-1010; see also G. Michael Harvey, Confidentiality:
A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2413 (1992) (finding
with respect to private facts cases that “[i]f the lower courts’ approach to private facts cases is
heavily biased towards the press, then the Supreme Court’s test for restricting publication of
truthful information positively capitulates it.”).
23. The First Amendment reads in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (finding unconstitutional a civil
damages award entered against a television station for broadcasting the name of a rape-murder
victim when the name was obtained from courthouse records); Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. District
Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam) (finding that a state court cannot enjoin the dissemination of the identity of a juvenile offender where members of the press were present at hearing
on delinquency and no objections were made as to their presence); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (finding unconstitutional the indictment of two newspapers for violating
a state statute forbidding newspapers to publish, without written approval of the juvenile court,
the name of any juvenile youth charged as a juvenile offender). In the most recent case, a rape
victim sued a newspaper under a Florida statute and Florida’s common law public disclosure
tort for printing her name in its “Police Report” column. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524, 527 (1989). The Court reversed the jury award of damages for the plaintiff finding that
“where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment
may be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.”
Id. at 538-39. Since the newspaper had obtained the plaintiff’s name (“B.J.F.”) from a police
department report mistakenly placed in the pressroom, the rape victim’s name had been lawfully obtained. See id. at 527 (note, however, that the newspaper admittedly violated its own
internal policy of not publishing the names of sexual offense victims). In light of the very private nature of disclosing the name of a sexual assault victim, the dissent correctly points out
that “[i]f the First Amendment prohibits wholly private persons (such as B.J.F.) from recovering for the publication of the fact that she was raped, I doubt that there remain any ‘private
facts’ which persons may assume will not be published in the newspapers or broadcast on television.” Id. at 550-51 (White, J., dissenting). A poignant fact not to be overlooked in the case
is that as a result of the rape victim’s name being published by the Florida Star, the victim
“received harassing phone calls, required mental health counseling, was forced to move from
her home, and was even threatened with being raped again.” Id. at 542-43.
25. See Prosser, supra note 12, at 389; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
652B, 652D (1977). The tort of intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion is made out by showing
that (1) there was an intentional prying, (2) the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) the intrusion was on something private. See id. § 652B. The defendant
commits the tort of public disclosure when (1) a disclosure is made to the public (there is no
disclosure if the facts are revealed to only a few people), (2) the facts disclosed are private
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sure of something so private about the plaintiff that a reasonable person would find the disclosure highly offensive. These two broad
models offer a healthy comparison for highlighting what some commentators view as gaps in existing English tort remedies,26 particularly as they affect the actions of media defendants.27
III. PRIVACY AND THE PRESS IN ENGLAND
A. Legislative Failures
Without a written constitution,28 and until the incorporation of
the ECHR into domestic legislation, Parliament was fully responsible
for protecting the individual rights of its citizens and the courts had
no power of judicial review over Parliament’s acts.29 In short, Parliament was sovereign.30
Although the right of privacy has never received explicit recognition under English law,31 British legislators have nevertheless realized
the failure of their common law to mirror the early American development of a right to privacy. Accordingly, Parliament has made several attempts to create laws protecting privacy. These attempts,
however, can best be described as a “patch work affair.”32
One such bill, introduced in 1969, sought to create “a general
right of privacy applicable to all situations.”33 The proponents of this
facts, (3) the facts disclosed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (4) the facts
are not of legitimate concern to the public. See id. § 652D. The two other Prosser torts will not
be addressed since the tort of appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness and the tort of
false light are better understood as, respectively, a proprietary wrong and a derivative of defamation law. See WACKS, supra note 15, at 14; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652A cmt. B (1977).
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. For the purposes of this Note, it is assumed that private facts made public by media
defendants are true facts and thus no defamation action would lie.
28. See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 738 (2d ed.
1994); see also text accompanying note 5, supra.
29. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 959-60 (2d ed.
1995).
30. Lord Bingham, the Lord Chief Justice, humorously epitomized Parliament’s sovereignty by using the old saying: Parliament has the power “to do anything except make a man a
woman or a woman man.” T.H. Bingham, The European Convention On Human Rights: Time
to Incorporate, 109 LAW Q. REV. 390, 391 (1993).
31. See Gerald Dworkin, Privacy and the Law, in PRIVACY 113, 115 (John B. Young ed.,
1978); see also Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62; Malone v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1984).
32. Krotoszynski, supra note 15, at 1402.
33. COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, JUSTICE, PRIVACY AND THE LAW ¶ 128.
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bill concluded that “English law is seriously defective as it now
stands, and that there is an urgent need for legislation. Such legislation could take a variety of possible forms, but on balance we think
that the best method would be to create a new statutory tort of
‘infringement of privacy.’”34 Among other reasons, the bill failed
over fear that it vested too much discretion in the courts.35
Realizing a need for privacy protection, Parliament authorized a
more comprehensive review of the right of privacy under the direction of Kenneth Younger.36 The Younger Committee sought to “give
further protection to the individual citizen and to commercial and industrial interests against intrusion into privacy by private persons and
organization.”37 The Committee agreed with Warren and Brandeis
that privacy embodied values essential to a free society.38 Ultimately,
however, the Committee rejected the idea of a general right of privacy, reasoning that the equitable remedy of breach of confidence39
offered adequate protection of privacy in England, although “the extent of its potential effectiveness is not widely recognized and that it
should be.”40 The Committee concluded that “the best way to ensure
regard for privacy is to provide specific and effective sanctions
against clearly defined activities which unreasonably frustrate the individual in his search of privacy.”41
As the Younger Committee conceded, however, “[t]his piecemeal approach leaves some gaps. In the private sector (with which
alone we are concerned) it is not difficult to think of some kind of intrusions, most obviously by journalistic investigators or by prying
neighbors, for which our recommendations provide no remedy.”42
The Committee’s conclusions relied in large part on its hopes that the
media would reform itself: “some of our proposals frankly rely, to an
extent which some may find over-optimistic, upon the readiness of
potentially intrusive agencies, such as the press, to respond not to legal sanctions but to the pressures of public and professional criticism
and to the climate of society.”43
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. ¶ 10.
See 794 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 943 (1970).
See WALTER F. PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 183 (1979).
Id. at 183-84.
See Younger Report, supra note 4, ¶ 113.
See infra note 48.
Younger Report, supra note 4, ¶ 87.
Id. ¶ 663.
Id. ¶ 659.
Id.
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A recent legislative enactment that could be traced back to the
recommendations of the Younger Committee is the Protection from
Harassment Act.44 The Harassment Act provides civil, criminal, and
injunctive remedies against a person who harasses a victim “if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the
course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.”45 It is too
early, however, to determine the extent to which the Harassment Act
can be used by plaintiffs seeking to curb media intrusions or to compensate them for past intrusions. But in time, this legislative enactment may serve to protect privacy interests.
B. Domestic Privacy Gap?
The Younger Committee concluded that the equitable remedy
for breach of confidence served to protect privacy interests in England.46 The equitable remedy for breach of confidence47 is made out
when the plaintiff can show that (1) the information was confidential,
(2) there was an implicit or explicit obligation of confidence, and (3)
the party to whom the confidential information was imparted used
that information without authorization.48 The obvious limitation of
this remedy is that there must be a prior confidential relationship before the tort can arise.49 The impact of this limitation is illustrated by

44. Protection from Harassment Act of 1997, ch. 40 (Eng.). The British Act is similar to,
and most likely drew its inspiration from, American stalking laws which have gained popularity
in the last decade. The first such statute in the U.S. was California’s Stalking Law. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 646.9 (1990).
45. Protection from Harassment Act § 1(2).
46. See Younger Report, supra note 4, ¶657.
47. See FRANCIS GURRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE (1984) for an exhaustive treatise on
this topic. This remedy was traditionally used to protect commercial secrets but it has since
grown to protect the disclosure of private facts. See WACKS, supra note 15, at 83.
48. See WACKS, supra note 12, at 50; see also Saltman Eng’g Co. v. Campbell Eng’g Co.
[1963] All E.R. 413.
49. See WACKS, supra note 12, at 58. Wacks emphasizes that the equitable remedy for
breach of confidence and the American disclosure tort serve different goals. “The American
tort therefore protects the plaintiff against wide publicity being given to certain classes of information. The purpose of the law of confidence, on the other hand, though it requires the information to be ‘confidential,’ is essentially to maintain the fidelity or trust that the plaintiff has
reposed in the person to whom he has confided certain information. . . . [T]he action for breach
of confidence concentrates on the source rather than, as in the ‘privacy’ tort, the content of the
information.” Id. While Wacks acknowledges that recent case law has enlarged the contours
of the breach of confidence action, he nonetheless cautions that England has not yet reached a
“new dawn of ‘privacy’ protection.” Id. at 79. Another author finds that “there is uncertainty
as to the fundamental principles on which the action for breach of confidence is based; there
are problems relating to the initial creation of the obligation of confidence; and there are
doubts as to the position of the person acquiring information without actual or constructive
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Kaye v. Robinson.
Gorden Kaye, a famous television actor in Britain, suffered a severe head injury when a piece of wood came loose from an advertising billboard and crashed through his car’s windshield.51 He was subsequently placed on life support for three days in an intensive care
unit and was moved nine days later to a private hospital room. The
hospital placed a large notice outside Kaye’s door asking visitors to
check in with the staff before entering. A similar notice was placed at
the entrance of the hospital ward. Ignoring both notices, a Sunday
Sport journalist and photographer entered the room and got, as the
editor of the newspaper put it in his affidavit to the court, their “great
old fashioned scoop.”52 The nursing staff entered the room some
time later and failed in their attempts to persuade the journalist and
photographer to leave. Finally, hospital security staff were called to
the room and ejected the intruders. Kaye was so heavily sedated that
he did not remember the incident fifteen minutes after it happened.
Kaye brought four causes of action against the Sunday Sport in
an attempt to enjoin publication: libel, trespass to the person, passing
off, and malicious falsehood. Kaye did not include a cause of action
for breach of confidence, presumably realizing the limitations of this
equitable remedy.
The court found that libel could not conclusively be shown, and
therefore a complete injunction was denied.53 The trespass to the
person count failed because there was no proof of physical harm.54
The passing off claim was rejected as baseless,55 but the court did find
sufficient merit in the malicious falsehood claim to enjoin the Sunday
Sport from printing any inference that would lead a reader to believe
the plaintiff consented to the interview.56 In the end, the Sunday
57
Sport got their story and printed their pictures.

knowledge of its confidential character.” LAHAV, supra note 4, at 42.
50. See Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62.
51. See id. at 63 (Glidewell, L.J.).
52. Id. at 64.
53. See id. at 67, 69 (Glidewell, L.J.).
54. See id. at 68-69 (Glidewell, L.J.) (finding that the flash bulbs used by the photographer
to take the patient’s picture did not in fact cause the plaintiff prolonged recovery or actual
harm).
55. See id. at 69 (Glidewell, L.J.) (finding that the plaintiff was not in the position of a
trader in relation to his interest in the story about his accident and recovery).
56. See id. at 67-68 (Glidewell, L.J.) (finding that any jury would conclude that words in
the article falsely represented that the article was obtained with the patient’s consent).
57. See id. at 69.
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The Kaye court went to great lengths to stress the need for a
remedy in such cases. Judge Glidewell suggested that “[t]he facts of
the present case are a graphic illustration of the desirability of Parliament considering whether and in what circumstances statutory
provision can be made to protect the privacy of individuals.”58 Judge
Bingham added, “[t]his case nonetheless highlights, yet again, the
failure of both the common law of England and statute to protect in
an effective way the personal privacy of individual citizens.”59 Finally, Judge Leggatt cited both the Warren and Brandeis article and
60
Barber v. Time, Inc. to underscore the need for greater protection.
It is important to note that under English law a court will not award
damages where there is a publication of true facts.61 In the United
States, however, a plaintiff is able to recover damages for intrusion.62
(While the disclosure is weighed against the First Amendment, the
intrusion is judged separately against the reasonableness standard determining the “highly offensive” nature of the facts disclosed.63) In
Kaye, it was not untruthful to report that the patient was indeed in
the hospital recovering from an injury, thus the court could not impose pecuniary damages on the Sunday Sport for publication of that
fact.64
58. Id. at 66 (Glidewell, L.J.).
59. Id. at 70 (Bingham, L.J.). In stark contrast to Kaye, the French sensationalist magazine Paris-Match was ordered to pay $18,600 for printing pictures of the late French President
Francois Mitterrand on his deathbed. See France Fines Magazine for Deathbed Photos of Mitterrand, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 14, 1997, at A03, available in 1997 WL 4133094. The
photographer who took the pictures of the corpse was also ordered to pay a symbolic twenty
cents to each member of the Mitterrand family. See id.
60. See Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62, 71 (Leggatt, L.J.).
61. See WACKS, supra note 12, at 145. Though Wacks overlooks the Florida Star decision,
discussed supra Part II, it would seem that in a majority of cases this rule would also apply in
the United States.
62. While placing a pecuniary value on the intrusion alone would be difficult—a matter
left to the jury—courts have found that an invasion suit does not require proof of special damages. See, e.g., Jones v. U.S. Child Support Recovery, 961 F. Supp. 1518 (D. Utah 1997). With
respect to physical intrusion, there is in the Untied States, as in the United Kingdom, no general press privilege to gather information. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). The
Supreme Court found that “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.” Id. at 12 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965));
see also WACKS, supra note 12, at 126.
63. See WACKS, supra note 12, at 145.
64. There can be no recovery for damages caused by mental distress, that is the annoyance, grief, or anxiety associated with the publication if, once again, the facts are true. See id.
Such recoveries have been awarded in false imprisonment, nuisance, and trespass to goods
cases. See id. Additionally, there can be no recovery for intentional infliction of emotional
distress since this action requires that the defendant’s act was designed to cause physical harm.
See id. at 87-88. The court in Kaye was faced with an appeal by Sunday Sport from the grant of
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Kaye also illustrates the shortcomings of both nuisance and trespass causes of action. A prerequisite to any such action is having an
interest in the land upon which the trespass or a nuisance occurred.65
With respect to damages, such actions are often of little use since
they are calculated according to how much the trespass interfered
with the plaintiff’s use of the land.66 Where the intruder is a curious
journalist, such damages will be difficult to establish.67
However, in a recent English case, one judge in dicta took a position that would expand the current scope of the breach of confidence
remedy.68 The case involved a photograph of a convicted thief taken
while the plaintiff had been in custody and which had subsequently
been given by the police to neighborhood shopkeepers.69 From these
facts, Judge Laws ventured:
If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and
with no authority a picture of another engaged in some private act,
his subsequent disclosure of the photograph would, in my judgement, as surely amount to a breach of confidence as if he had found
or stolen a letter or diary in which the act was recounted and proceeded to publish it. In such a case, the law would protect what
might reasonably be called a right of privacy, although the name
accorded to the cause of action would be breach of confidence. It
is, of course, elementary that, in all such cases, a defence based on
70
public interest would be availing.

Notwithstanding this unique perspective, some commentators
still urge that English law recognize an action for intrusion and one
for disclosure of private facts in order to fill the gaps left by the
breach of confidence remedy.71
an interlocutory injunction. Though the publication could not be enjoined, the court did acknowledge that “Mr. Kaye’s story was one for which other newspapers would be willing to pay
‘large sums of money.’ It needs little imagination to appreciate that whichever journal secured
the first interview with Mr. Kaye would be willing to pay the most. Mr. Kaye thus has a potentially valuable right to sell the story of his accident and his recovery when he is fit enough to
tell it.” Kaye [1991] F.S.R. at 68 (Glidewell, L.J.).
65. See generally Cunard v. Antifyre, Ltd. [1933] 1 K.B. 551, 564. Though at least one
commentator has noted that the hospital could have been joined as a co-plaintiff in the action
against Sunday Sport. See WACKS, supra note 12, at 129 n.24.
66. See WACKS, supra note 12, at 144.
67. See id.
68. See Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 804, 811-12. The
dicta in this case would still be unavailing in Kaye. Comparable expansions of the breach of
confidence remedy were in fact one of the Younger Committee’s recommendations. See
Younger Report, supra note 4, ¶ 87.
69. See Hellewell [1995] 1 W.L.R. at 806.
70. Id. at 807.
71. See, e.g., WACKS, supra note 12, at 142.
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C. Regulating the Press in England
At the same time Kaye was making headlines, the Committee on
Privacy and Related Matters, better known as the Calcutt Committee, was preparing its final report.72 The Calcutt Committee was organized to inquire into abuses of personal privacy by the press; more
accurately, the media’s obsession with printing intimate facts about
the lives of both politicians and the British royal family.73 The Kaye
decision was an additional factor in the Calcutt Committee’s conclusions.74
To better understand the role of the Calcutt Committee, it is
helpful to first examine how the press had previously been regulated.
In 1953, the Press Council was created by the Press Commission to
act as a public relations agency and forum for grievances by angry individuals.75 Its constitution was vague at best, and because members
of the Council were almost exclusively composed of press representatives, the complaint process was viewed with suspicion.76 The process
forced a complainant to waive the right to adjudicate his claim in
court as a precondition to having his complaint reviewed by the Press
Council.77 With public perception of the Press Council in decline, the
Calcutt Committee was convened to find a solution.78 The Calcutt
72. See COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND
RELATED MATTERS, 1990, Cmnd. 1102 [hereinafter Calcutt Committee]. The Committee was
chaired by David Calcutt, Q.C.
73. See WACKS, supra note 12, at 12.
74. See Raymond Snoddy, The Press on a Slippery Slope, FIN. TIMES, June 23, 1990, at 7,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnews File. The Calcutt Committee reprinted a copy of
the Kaye decision in the appendix to their report. See Calcutt Committee, supra note 72, app. I.
75. See JAMES CURRAN & JEAN SEATON, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 295 (2d ed.
1985).
76. See LAHAV, supra note 4, at 47. The Press Council’s constitution vaguely described
the purposes of the organization: “(a) To preserve the established freedom of the British press.
(b) To maintain the character of the British press in accordance with the highest professional
and commercial standards. (c) To consider complaints about the conduct of the press or the
conduct of persons and organizations towards the press, to deal with these complaints in whatever manner might seem practical and appropriate and record result and action.” Id. The
wording of the constitution alone tells a tale of an organization that is bound to disappoint.
77. See id. at 76 n.413; see also Calcutt Committee, supra note 72, ¶ 14.23.
78. See Snoddy, supra note 74, at 7. The reporter notes that in an interview, Calcutt admitted that the Kaye case was an important factor in deciding whether to change the law on
privacy. See id. The article reports that in a public opinion poll, fifty-two percent of people
believed that there was a decline in newspaper ethics over the past five years and that seventythree percent agreed that newspapers intruded too much in the private lives of public figures.
See id. One such reported case of gross intrusion on the part of journalists concerns a story in
The Sun about Elton John’s private life. See id. The singer ultimately reached a million pound
out-of-court libel settlement with the paper. See id.
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Committee came to a consensus on the elusive definition of privacy,
finding it to be “the right of the individual to be protected against intrusion into his personal life or affairs, or those of his family, by direct physical means or by publication of information.”79
In accord with the Younger Committee, the Calcutt Committee
found there was no need for a statutory right of privacy.80 The Committee called for criminal sanctions when the media (1) entered private property without consent in order to gather personal information, (2) placed a surveillance device on private property without
consent, or (3) took a photograph or recorded the voice of someone
without his consent when that person was on private property.81 Parliament, however, has enacted none of these proposals.82
To confront the problem of an undisciplined media, the Calcutt
Committee recommended the media be “given one final chance to
prove that voluntary self-regulation can be made to work”83 and proposed a solution whereby the fatally flawed Press Council would be
replaced with a new body, the Press Complaints Commission (PCC).84
79. Calcutt Committee, supra note 72, ¶ 3.7.
80. See id. ¶ 12.5.
81. See id. ¶ 6.33.
82. The Calcutt Committee issued a follow-up report in 1993 which called for immediate
legislation for the protection of privacy. See DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL HERITAGE, REVIEW
OF PRESS SELF-REGULATION, 1993, Cmnd. 2135, ¶ 8.2. In the same year, the Lord Chancellor’s Department came out with a consultation paper entitled “Infringement of Privacy” which
condemned the fact that the law did not adequately protect privacy and that there should be an
actionable tort for infringement of privacy where the infringement caused “substantial distress.” See GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS NATIONAL HERITAGE
SELECT COMMITTEE, PRIVACY AND MEDIA INTRUSION, 1995, Cmnd. 2918, ¶ 1.1. The government responded in 1995 and once again rejected the idea of a general right of privacy finding that, inter alia, press self-regulation was working effectively, a privacy law would curb
worthwhile investigative journalism, and there was insufficient popular pressure for this law.
See id. ¶ 4.13. Notwithstanding the government’s conclusion, a poll in 1993 found that seventysix percent of Britons favored a right of privacy. See Stuart Weir, Talking Liberties: Need for a
U.K. Bill of Rights, NEW STATESMAN & SOCIETY, Nov. 12, 1993, at 15, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnews File.
83. Calcutt Committee, supra note 68, ¶ 14.38. The recommendation of the Calcutt
Committee reads, “[w]e therefore recommend that the Press Council should be disbanded and
replaced by a new body, specifically charged with adjudicating on complaints of press malpractice. This body must be seen as authoritative, independent and impartial. It must also have
jurisdiction over the press as a whole, must be adequately funded and must provide a means of
seeking to prevent publication of intrusive material. We consider it particularly important to
suggest a break from the past. The new body should, therefore, be called the Press Complaints
Commission.” Id.
84. See id. Faced with the possibility of legislative action to curb media abuses, the press
was given eighteen months to regulate itself, a move accomplished by setting up the Press
Complaints Commission (PCC). See Jane Thynne, Press Shows Intent to Toe the Line, Says
Watchdog, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 18, 1991, at 8, available in 1991 WL 3148045.
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The PCC is a non-statutory independent organization that
proudly views its mission as “ensur[ing] that British newspapers and
magazines follow the letter and spirit of an ethical Code of Practice
dealing with issues such as inaccuracy, privacy, misrepresentation,
and harassment.”85 As with the Press Council before it, many of the
PCC members who oversee the complaint process are prominent
media members.86 The Code of Practice (Code) is the cornerstone of
the organization.87 The PCC adjudicates disputes involving alleged
breaches of the Code if talks between the parties fail. In the words of
the PCC, “[t]he code should not be interpreted so narrowly as to
compromise its commitment to respect the rights of the individual,
nor so broadly that it prevents publication in the public interest.”88
The Code has evolved regularly, with its most recent changes
coming in the wake of the Princess Diana tragedy in October of
1997.89 The Code is an ambitious work that seeks, inter alia, to ban

The PCC was established in 1991, replacing the discredited Press Council. See id.
85. Press Complaints Commission, About the PCC (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.pcc.
org.uk/about/home.htm>.
86. See Press Complaints Commission, Commission Members (visited Apr. 1, 1998)
<http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/ members.htm>.
87. See Press Complaints Commission, Code of Practice (visited Apr. 1, 1998)
<http://www.pcc.org. uk/about/complain/newcode.htm> [hereinafter Code]. The Code of Practice was first drafted in November of 1990 under the auspices of the now defunct Press Council.
See generally Press Given “Last Chance” to Regulate Itself in U.K., EDMONTON JOURNAL
(Canada), June 22, 1990, at 14.
88. Code, supra note 87, pmbl.
89. The Princess of Wales was killed in a traffic accident in Paris on August 31, 1997. The
chauffeur driven car was allegedly speeding away from photographers who were in hot pursuit
of her vehicle. While blame first fell squarely on the photographers, it was later revealed that
the chauffeur was driving while intoxicated. Soon after these reports came out, it was then suspected that her car had collided with another vehicle before crashing into the side of an underground tunnel. See, e.g., Christopher Dickey & Mark Hosenball, A Needless Tragedy,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 22, 1997, at 54. But see Mark Hosenball & Christopher Dickey with Geoffrey Cowley, Case Very Nearly Closed: Police are Looking for that Fiat and the Fayeds Hint of
Conspiracy, but the Crash Looks Like a Routine Accident, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 1997, at 65.
The late Princess of Wales had for many years been the target of intrusive press coverage. In
one incident, the owner of a gym where the princess regularly worked out set up a hidden camera in the ceiling above a piece of equipment the princess was known to use. See Phil Taylor,
The Price of Privacy, SUNDAY-STAR TIMES (London), at A10, available in 1997 WL 15280866.
The gym owner then sold his pictures to a tabloid magazine for over a million dollars. See id.
In an unusual move for a royal family member, the princess filed an action against the gym
owner and the magazine. See Princess Diana May Testify in Her Suit over Photos, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 1995, at A14, available in 1995 WL 6403495. The Code has undergone
changes since the death of the princess to reflect stricter provisions on privacy, among which
are a ban on persistent pursuit and explicit recognition that children should be protected from
press coverage. See Code, supra note 87, § 4(i) (for persistent pursuit), § 6 (for the treatment of
children). See generally British Press Given Stricter Privacy Code, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 26,
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persistent pursuit by journalists,90 require journalists to identify themselves before entering non-public areas in hospitals,91 and prevent
editors from publishing materials from other sources that do not
comply with the letter of the Code.92 The section of the Code which
relates to privacy states that, “(i) [e]veryone is entitled to respect for
his or her private and family life, home, health and correspondence.
A publication will be expected to justify intrusions into any individual’s private life without consent; (ii) [t]he use of long lens photography to take pictures of people in private places without their consent
is unacceptable.”93 This section further clarifies that “[p]rivate places
are public or private property where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.”94 It is interesting to note that the language in this
section of the Code mirrors the language of the privacy guarantee in
Article 8 of the ECHR.95 Perhaps this similarity is an attempt by the
drafters of the Code to give the appearance of being in conformity
with the ECHR framework.
The only true remedy afforded by the PCC and the Code is the
right to require publication of its adjudication in the offending newspaper or magazine, and, in limited circumstances, to provide a very
limited “opportunity for reply.”96 The PCC has no power to award
compensation, impose fines, or prevent, in even the most egregious
cases, an article from being published.97 Unsurprisingly, in the wake
of possible legislative action to curb media intrusions, the British
press has been an increasingly enthusiastic supporter of its own selfregulation.98
Indeed, the Code and the PCC may provide some useful background mechanisms for curbing media intrusions into certain recog1997, at N21, available in 1997 WL 4054231.
90. See Code, supra note 87, § 4(i).
91. See id. § 9(i). This section, undoubtedly a response to Kaye, notes further that “[t]he
restrictions on intruding into privacy are particularly relevant to enquiries about individuals in
hospitals or similar institutions.” Id. § 9(ii).
92. See id. § 4(iii).
93. Id. § 3(i-ii).
94. Id. § 3.
95. See infra Part IV.A for the full text of Article 8.
96. See id. § 2. Section 2 states that “[a] fair opportunity for reply to inaccuracies must be
given to individuals or organizations when reasonably called for.” Id. The equivocal “when
reasonably called for” language underlines that the right of reply is not mandatory in all cases,
even where “inaccuracies” are present. Id.
97. See WACKS, supra note 12, at 6.
98. See Britain’s Press Barons Promise Post-Diana Reform, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS
(London), Sept. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13396473.
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nized private areas. The Code is effective, for example, in situations
where the complainant brings a minor grievance to the PCC as an alternative to litigation. In such a case, the Chairman of the PCC, Lord
Wakeham, is correct in saying that “[a] full-blooded privacy law,
whether by common law or by a straightforward privacy law, would
mean that anybody who wished to enforce their rights to privacy runs
the risk of having to indulge in very expensive legal action.”99 Nonetheless, neither the PCC nor the Code is of any help to those who
wish to, or must, turn to a court to vindicate their rights. In such
cases, a self-regulation scheme built on a dubious foundation of journalistic integrity, rather than on the legislative recommendations of
the Calcutt Committee, provides little relief to aggrieved parties in
court.
IV. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The International Dimension
The ECHR was drafted in 1949 and became the first convention
signed under the auspices of the Council of Europe.100 The Council of
Europe was itself only one year away from its inception.101 The forty
States who signed this document bound themselves to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms”102 guaranteed
under the treaty.
The ECHR regulates the relationship between an individual and
the State. It gives the individual an expansive list of rights such as the
right to life,103 the right to respect for private life and family,104 the
right to freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment,105
the right to liberty and security of his person,106 the right to freedom
99. Robert Shimey, Wakeham Hopes His Press Code Will Head Off Privacy Law, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 9, 1997, at 12, available in 1997 WL 2357522.
100. The drafting of the ECHR was strongly influenced by the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. See SUE FARRAN, THE UK BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE LAW & COMMENTARY 1 (1996).
101. See Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, reprinted in MANUAL OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE 299 (1970).
102. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 1. As of October 1997, there were forty signatories to the
ECHR. See Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (visited Apr. 1, 1998)
<http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/5t.htm>.
103. See ECHR, supra note 1, art. 2.
104. See id. art. 8.
105. See id. art. 3.
106. See id. art. 5.
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of expression,107 and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion.108 An individual can bring a claim against any of the Contracting Parties that have accepted the right of individuals to petition
for a breach of a ECHR right.109
The European Court of Human Rights (European Court), located in Strasbourg, France, is the main judicial organ of the Council
of Europe.110 Until recently, bringing a case to the European Court
was a lengthy affair. First, a petitioner had to submit his or her application to the European Commission of Human Rights (European
Commission) which reviewed the application for admissibility.111 The
European Commission could then reject a petition for a variety of
reasons, for example, if the application was “manifestly illfounded”112 or if the petitioner had failed to first exhaust his domestic
remedies.113 If the European Commission accepted the petition, it attempted to settle the dispute amicably.114 If settlement talks reached
an impasse, the European Commission prepared a fact finding report,
formed an opinion as to whether the Contracting Party had breached
its obligation under the ECHR, and in the afirmative, forwarded the
report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.115
Only at this point could the petitioner have his claim reviewed by the
European Court.116
According to the Council of Europe, it took “on average over
five years for a case to be finally determined by the Court or the
Committee of Ministers.”117 In response to this long delay, all forty
Council of Europe members signed Protocol 11.118 On November 1,
1998, Protocol 11 came into force and effectively replaced the Euro-

107. See id. art. 10.
108. See id. art. 9.
109. See id. art. 25(1).
110. See BRICE DICKSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 9 (1997).
111. See ECHR, supra note 1, arts. 24-29.
112. Id. art. 27(2).
113. See id. art. 26.
114. See id. art. 28(1)(b).
115. See id. art. 31(1)(2).
116. See id. art. 48. If the case was not referred to the European Court within three months,
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe could decide by a two-thirds vote whether
there has been a violation of the ECHR. See id. art. 32(1); see also FARRAN, supra note 100, at
5-15 (explaining more fully this lengthy procedure).
117. Council of Europe: Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery
Established Thereby ¶ 21 (May 11, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 943 (1994).
118. See id. ¶23.
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pean Court and the European Commission119 with a single European
Court with full-time judges.120 This transformation created the largest
full-time international tribunal in the world with jurisdiction over 800
million people.121 Under this new structure, individuals have the right
to petition the European Court directly.122 The task of overseeing the
admissibility of cases, previously performed by the European Commission, will now be carried out by panels of three judges. 123 The criteria governing the admissibility of cases remains the same.124 If a
case is deemed admissible, the merits are then examined by a chamber of seven judges.125 If the case “raises serious questions concerning
the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols,
or if the case raises an issue of general importance,”126 the case can be
referred to a Grand Chamber consisting of seventeen judges.127 This
new mechanism seeks to eliminate the overlap in work between the
now defunct European Commission and the old European Court and
ultimately enable a petitioner to achieve a faster resolution of a dispute.128
The United Kingdom ratified the ECHR in 1950.129 However, in
the United Kingdom a treaty has no domestic effect until it has been
incorporated into domestic law through an act of Parliament.130 This
anomaly forced British subjects to seek redress for a violation of their
119. See id. ¶ 26. The Committee of Ministers will retain its powers to effect enforcement
along with other responsibilities.
120. See id. ¶ 26-37.
121. See Frances Gibb, Human Rights Go to Court, TIMES (London), Nov. 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL 4872482.
122. See Council of Europe, supra note 117, ¶ 38(a).
123. See id. ¶ 33-34.
124. See id. ¶ 41.
125. See id. ¶ 45.
126. Id. ¶ 46-47. Once a Chamber of seven judges has rendered a judgement, only the parties can at this stage request that the case be referred to a Grand Chamber.
127. See id. ¶ 36. The Grand Chamber also hears inter-State applications.
128. See id. ¶ 24. See generally Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, A Single
European Court of Human Rights is to Replace the Existing Commission and Court in Strasbourg, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 81 (1994) (providing a more detailed analysis of this fundamental
change).
129. See FARRAN, supra note 100, at 1.
130. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 28, at 741. In the United States, an international
treaty follows this same rule unless the treaty is found to be self-executing. The self-executing
doctrine receives no explicit recognition in the U.S. Constitution, but rather has surfaced as a
product of judicial creation. For an explanation of this doctrine, see CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 29, at 183-96. In comparison, in countries such as Germany and France, the ratification of a treaty at the international level makes the treaty part of domestic law without any further action. See DICKSON, supra note 110, at 3 n.8.
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treaty rights from judges in Strasbourg at the European Court because these claims were not justiciable in the courts of the United
Kingdom.131 In contrast, countries which had incorporated the
ECHR into their own law enabled their domestic judges to take full
account of its provisions when considering a grievance.132
In the abscence of any omnibus protection of human rights, the
United Kingdom has been before the European Court more times
than any other signatory to the Convention, with the exception of Italy.133 If the European Court finds that a country’s practices are in
violation of the ECHR, that country must change those practices to
comply with the Convention.134 In effect, by ratifying the ECHR, the
British Parliament has compromised its once absolute sovereignty
and bound itself to implement the European Court’s decisions. 135
For the purposes of this Note, focus is given to specific articles of
the ECHR—mainly Articles 8, 10, and 13. First, these articles will be
set forth. Then we will explore how they affect the balance between
privacy and the press in Britain.
Article 8 guarantees that:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national secu-

131. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 29, at 960. The United Kingdom recognized the
right of an individual to petition in 1966. See FARRAN, supra note 100, at 2.
132. See FARRAN, supra note 100, at 3-4.
133. See European Court of Human Rights, Table Showing Referrals to and Judgments and
Decisions of the Court, 1960-1998 (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/apercustab.
htm>. The European Court has decided fifty-two cases against the United Kingdom. See id.
Additionally, a poll conducted in England in 1995 found that seventy-nine percent of respondents favored a bill of rights for Britain. See Why Britain Needs a Bill of Rights, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 21, 1995, at 64. Norway, which is also a signatory to the ECHR, might be expected to be a
frequent violator since it too has not incorporated the Convention into its domestic law. See
generally DONALD W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 16-18 (1997). However, due largely to its written constitution, this is not the case. See id.
134. See Barry Newman, Legal Anomaly: Lacking Bill of Rights, Britons Seek Redress at a
Court in France, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1985, available in 1985 WL-WSJ 230430 (canvassing
some of the most recent decisions by the European Court against the United Kingdom).
135. Article 46 of the ECHR states that the contracting parties may “recogniz[e] as compulsory . . . the jurisdiction of the Court in matters concerning the interpretation and application of the . . . Convention.” ECHR, supra note 1, art. 46. The interrelation of this article,
which the United Kingdom has recognized, and Article 25, which allows an individual to petition the European Court, gives an individual rights that his country must not abridge, but more
importantly gives him a mechanism by which to enforce them.
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rity, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
136
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Article 10 guarantees that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impar137
tiality of the judiciary.

Article 13 guarantees that:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
138
persons acting in an official capacity.

B. The Domestic Dimension
The impetus for incorporating the ECHR into the domestic laws
of the United Kingdom is one driven by practical considerations. In
a White Paper entitled Rights Brought Home: the Human Rights Bill,
the Labour government set out its reasons for incorporation.139 In the
words of Prime Minister Tony Blair, incorporation “will give people
in the United Kingdom opportunities to enforce their rights under
the European Convention in British courts rather than having to incur the cost and delay of taking a case to the European Human
Rights Commission and Court in Strasbourg. It will enhance the
awareness of human rights in our society.”140 Instead of having only
136. Id. art. 8.
137. Id. art. 10.
138. Id. art. 13.
139. See RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997, Cmnd. 3782.
140. Id. Preface by the Prime Minister. As one commentator in favor of incorporation put
it, “[t]he main purpose of incorporating the Convention into U.K. law would be to make available a Bill of Rights that could be accessed more speedily, more cheaply, and more easily than
is now the case.” Michael Zander, A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom-Now, 32 TEX. INT’L
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judges in Strasbourg interpret the treaty, courts in the United Kingdom will share in this responsibility.
As a result of the recently enacted Human Rights Act (Act),141 it
is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible
with the ECHR.142 Before the ECHR was incorporated domestically,
English judges rarely recognized its guarantees in their decisions.143
Reference was made to the ECHR where, for instance, ambiguous
language in legislation was interpreted to be consistent with the obligations under the ECHR since Parliament was presumed not to legislate contrary to international obligations.144 With respect to the
common law, English judges referred to the ECHR where the rule
was unclear.145 Nonetheless, the ECHR had not been a direct source
of rights and duties in the domestic courts of the United Kingdom.146
Since a court is a public body under the Act, courts in the United
Kingdom are now charged directly with a duty to invoke the Act’s
guarantees if they are being violated. This provision leads directly to
another important aspect of the Act: the sovereignty of Parliament.
British judges have never had the power of judicial review over Acts
of Parliament, and thus cannot strike down its laws.147 On this point,
a compromise was reached requiring judges to interpret legislation,
both past and prospective, in a way that is “compatible” with the
Act.148 If such a reading is impossible and legislation cannot be
squared with ECHR obligations, judges can declare the law

L.J. 441, 442 (1997). This is not the first time that there have been attempts to introduce a bill
of rights in the U.K. See DAVID KINLEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
COMPLIANCE WITHOUT INCORPORATION 1-2 (1993).
141. See Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
142. See id. cl. 6. Clause 6 reads in part, “[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a
way which is incompatible with a Convention right. . . . In this section, ‘public authority’ includes (a) a court or tribunal, and (2) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a
public nature. . . .” Id. cl. 6(1), 6(3)(a-b). Furthermore, “[a] person who claims that a public
authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by 6(1) may (a) bring
proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate . . . tribunal. . . .” Id. cl.
7(1)(a).
143. See FARRAN, supra note 100, at 3-4.
144. See, e.g., Brind v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. [1991] 1 All E.R. 720.
145. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1988] 3 All E.R. 545, 580-82.
146. See Malone v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2) [1979] 2 All E.R. 620, 621;
see also infra note 157.
147. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 29, at 959-60.
148. See Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42, cl. 3(1) (Eng.) (“So far as it is possible to do so,
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is
compatible with the Convention rights. . . .”).

CARNEGIEFINAL.DOC

1998]

04/02/99 3:35 PM

PRIVACY AND THE PRESS

333

“incompatible.”149 In such a case, judges have no power to strike
down the law; they can only make a declaration of incompatibility
and simply wait for Parliament to change it.150
The Act nevertheless gives British judges relatively more power
than they previously possessed. The broad language of the Act,
which mirrors the language of the ECHR, leaves considerable room
for interpretation. As a way of containing this potentially large scope
for interpretation, the Act explicitly states that judges are to “take
into account” the jurisprudence of the European Court.151 If the interpretation given by domestic courts is in error, a defeated British
litigant can seek review of the domestic decision in the European
Court.
C. Which Way Does the European Court Lean?
Articles 8 and 10 of the Act152 do not provide absolute rights.
That is, they can be proscribed in certain situations.153 The structure
of these two articles is strikingly similar. The right to be protected is
set out in broad language in the first paragraph. The second paragraph then sets out in equally broad terms certain conditions where

149. See id. cl. 4(2) (“If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.”).
150. See id. cl. 4(6)(a-b) (Any such declaration of incompatibility “(a) does not affect the
validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given;
and (b) is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.”). A fast track
mechanism is provided by the Act to ensure that a law that has been found to be incompatible
with the ECHR gets to Parliament for review swiftly. See id. art. 10. This fast track has not
been without its criticisms. See, e.g., Andrew Le Sueur, Rights Bill: Not Far Enough, or Too
Far?, TIMES (London), Oct. 31, 1997, at 21, available in 1997 WL 9239681.
151. See Human Rights Act cl. 2(1). The clause states:
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen under this Act in connection with a Convention right must take into account any:
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of
Human Rights,
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the Convention,
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the Convention, or
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention,
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant
to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.
152. The language of ECHR Articles 8 and 10 is adopted verbatim in the Human Rights
Act.
153. These qualified rights oppose themselves to the non-derogable rights which a State is
obliged in all circumstances to respect. See ECHR, supra note 1, arts. 8, 9, 10. Article 3 establishes such a right. It guarantees that “[n]o-one shall be subject to torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Id. art. 3.
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an interference with the right is justified. To be justified, an interference must be lawful, seek to achieve a legitimate goal, and must be
necessary in a democratic society.
The European Court’s analysis emulates this two-part structure.
Thus, the Court first considers whether there has been an infringement of the right set out in the first paragraph; if the Court determines there has been an infringement, it then decides whether that
infringement is in accord with the second qualifying paragraph.
1. Article 8 Jurisprudence. Article 8 defines a broad right of
“respect” for one’s private life, family life, home, and correspondence
against intrusion by the State. The European Court delineated the
contours of this right in Marckx v. Belgium154 and reiterated this
finding in Airey v. Ireland.155 In particular, Marckx and Airey are
important for their definition of the word “respect,” a word which
qualifies the many facets of privacy that Article 8 covers.156 The right
to “respect,” the European Court found, implies a positive obligation
on the part of the State to provide protection from infringements by
third parties. Thus, Article 8 is violated not only when the State itself
violates the complainant’s privacy,157 but also when the State does not

154. See Marckx v. Belgium, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 330 (1979-1980). In this case the
plaintiff complained that certain aspects of the illegitimacy laws in Belgium, such as the requirement that maternal affiliation could be established only by a formal act of recognition,
violated Article 8 because the legislation failed to respect her family life and discriminated between illegitimate and legitimate families in violation of Article 14. The court found, with respect to Article 8, that respect for family life, be it a legitimate or illegitimate family, “implies
in particular, in the court’s view, the existence in domestic law of legal safeguards that render
possible, as from the moment of birth, the child’s integration in its family.” Id. at 341-42.
155. See Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 305 (1979-1980). In this case the plaintiff wished to petition for judicial separation in the Irish High Court, but she could not afford an
attorney. Since the State would not provide one in a civil case, she claimed that this constituted
a violation of her Article 6 right to a fair trial as well as a violation of Article 8 because the
State had failed to provide an accessible legal procedure for the determination of rights created
by Irish family law. With respect to the Article 8 claim, the European Court found that Ireland
had failed to respect her family life since she was effectively barred from petitioning for a judicial separation from her husband. See id. at 318-19.
156. The European Court expressly endorsed the view that the word “respect” qualifies not
only family life but private life as well when it stated, “the court is led in the present case to
clarify the meaning and purport of the words ‘respect for . . . private and family life.’” Marckx,
2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 341 (ellipses in original).
157. See Malone v. Commiss’r of Police (No. 2) [1979] 1 Ch. 344. Malone is a classic case
with respect to Article 8 and intrusion by the State. The plaintiff was being prosecuted for receiving stolen goods. During the course of his criminal proceeding, he discovered that police
had tapped his telephone. The Court of Appeals effectively closed the door on a common law
right to privacy declaring that “[n]o new right in the law, fully fledged with all the appropriate
safeguards, can spring from the head of a judge deciding a particular case: only Parliament can
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provide a mechanism whereby the right of “respect for” privacy can
be protected against the intrusions of others. In Airey, the European
Court relied on its holding in Marckx to articulate the State’s twofold
obligation:
Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the
individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it
does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference:
in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be
positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or
158
family life.

The Court summarized the State’s “positive obligations” by explaining that Article 8 protects a complainant who argues “not that the
State has acted but that it has failed to act.”159
2. Article 10 Jurisprudence. The European Court’s free
expression jurisprudence cannot be easily summarized. Certainly any
comparisons between the United States’ robust First Amendment
and the ECHR’s Article 10 would be misplaced.
In Sunday Times v. United Kingdom,160 for example, a newspaper
challenged an injunction that prevented the publication of an article
about mothers whose medications during pregnancy had caused birth
defects in their children. The European Court disagreed with the
English domestic court and found that the injunction was not justified
under any of the three qualifiers in Article 10(2). In another case,
the European Court found that an injunction preventing British
newspapers from printing excerpts of the banned novel “Spycatcher”
violated Article 10, because the injunction was unnecessary in light of
the fact that the book had previously been published in the United
States.161
Free expression was upheld, or more accurately not compelled,
create such a right.” Id. at 372-73. The Court of Appeals concluded that in the absence of legislation on the topic, the phone tapping had been legal because Parliament has recognized the
Home Secretary’s power to authorize such action. Arguing that his Article 8 rights had been
violated, Malone took his case all the way to the Strasbourg. A unanimous European Court
agreed that the English practice of telephone-tapping by administrative warrant and the police
practice of “metering” information about telephone calls without a warrant was a violation of
Article 8. See Malone v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1984). In response to
this ruling, Parliament passed the Interception of Communications Act of 1985. See Interception of Communications Act of 1985, ch. 56 (Eng.).
158. Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 305 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 245 (1979-1980).
161. See The Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 86
(1991).
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in Goodwin v. United Kingdom.162 Goodwin, a journalist who had legally obtained some sensitive and “strictly confidential” information
concerning the finances of a company, was enjoined by an English
court from publishing his discovery and further ordered to reveal his
source. Goodwin refused to disclose his source and was found in contempt of court. The journalist took his case to Strasbourg, and the
European Court found that although the interference was prescribed
by law163 and was in pursuit of a legitimate aim, the contempt order
could not be said to be “necessary in a democratic society.”164 The
injunction alone adequately protected the company and therefore the
disclosure order was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
The European Court stressed that “[f]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. . . .
Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information
and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them.”165 It is interesting to note that while the legality of the injunction was not an issue
before the European Court, the Court implicitly accepted this remedy when it found that revealing the source of the information was
unnecessary considering the injunction had already quashed the dissemination of the sensitive information.
Most recently, the European Court shed a little light on the
standard governing journalistic conduct. The complainants were
journalists who had published a series of caustic articles accusing
judges of bias in a messy custody battle. The Belgian courts affirmed
the judges’ defamation action against the journalists. The European
Court disagreed, finding that there had been a breach of Article 10.
The European Court held in part that “the press plays an essential
role in a democratic society. Although it must not overstep certain
bounds in respect of reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart—in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities—information and ideas on all matters of public interest,
including those relating to the functioning of the judiciary.”166
3. The Intersection of Article 8 and Article 10. The European
Court has never had occasion to police the intersection of the right of
privacy guaranteed under Article 8 and the competing interest

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 123 (1996).
See Contempt of Court Act of 1981, ch. 49, § 10 (Eng.).
Goodwin, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 149.
Id.
De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 1 (1998).
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favoring free expression in Article 10. One recent case, had it
reached the European Court, would have answered the question
squarely.
In Earl Spencer and Countess Spencer v. United
167
Kingdom, the brother and sister-in-law of the late Princess of Wales
brought an application to the European Commission arguing that the
absence of a right of privacy in England denied them the means of
either stopping the publication or obtaining monetary damages after
the publication of a lurid article about their marriage, family, and the
Countess’ health. The article in question, printed on the front page
of the News of the World, included the headline “Di’s Sister-in-Law
in Booze and Bulimia Clinic.” Beside the article, a photograph,
obtained without consent, showed Earl Spencer’s ex-wife walking the
grounds of the clinic where she was being treated for eating disorders
and alcoholism. The Spencers brought their claim under Article 8
arguing that their privacy had not been respected and that the breach
of confidence remedy was wholly inadequate in such a situation.168 It
was inadequate because they did not know of the article until after it
had been published and thus could not enjoin it prior to publication.
Furthermore, the essential elements of a breach of confidence action
had only limited effectiveness against such coverage, and even if they
could establish a breach of confidence, there was no realistic chance
of recovering money damages after publication.169 The Earl Spencer
argued that “this absence of a legal remedy is in violation of the
positive obligation on the United Kingdom contained in Article 8 of
the Convention to protect his right to respect for his private life.”170
The British government responded that the elements of a breach of
confidence action could have been established in this case and that
the Spencers would have been entitled to damages had they been
successful in their action against the newspaper.171 The European
Commission denied the application after a hearing, thus implicitly

167. See Press Communiqué Issued by the Secretary of the European Commission of Human
Rights (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.dhcommhr.coe.fr/eng/28851CEN.E.html>; see also
Charles Bremner, Spencer Loses fight to Challenge Privacy Law, TIMES (London), Jan. 17,
1998, at 6, available in 1998 WL 4810475.
168. See Bremner, supra note 167. The Spencers had previously brought a breach of confidence action against two acquaintances who had disclosed this personal information about the
couple. The case was settled in 1997 on the basis of a consent order of the High Court that restrained the acquaintances from further disclosing any information about the Spencers’ private
lives or affairs. See id.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. See id.
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siding with the government’s argument.172
The result in the Spencer case was foreshadowed in an earlier
case, rejected by the European Commission, in which the applicant
had won a libel suit based on false allegations in a book. The applicant could not, however, recover damages in an English court for allegations in the book that were true but invaded his right to privacy.
The European Commission accepted that the State could have a positive obligation in this area, but found existing remedies, such as
breach of confidence and defamation, were sufficient.173
D. Privacy and The Press Under the Act
The incorporation of the ECHR brings a right of privacy to the
United Kingdom. As with any other statute, when it is made a part
of domestic legislation, British subjects are given a right to bring a
cause of action under it. As noted above, however, the Act applies
only to “public authorities.”174 Seemingly, since the various magazines and newspapers that comprise the British press are private
bodies, they are beyond the reach of the Act. Such a conclusion,
however, would overlook the teaching of both Airey and Marckx. In
certain situations under Article 8, governments have a positive obligation to ensure that privacy rights are being respected. The European Commission’s decisions in this area, since no case has yet been
forwarded to the European Court, seem to establish a fairly low
threshold: if there are remedies available at the national level which
afford some degree of protection of privacy, then the State has fulfilled its positive obligation under Article 8 of the ECHR. The
Spencer case is in accord with this low threshold principle.
The Kaye case, however, offers a poignant example of where the
lack of remedies under English law could be held to be in violation of
Article 8 privacy rights. Since the press does not come within the
ambit of the Act’s definition of a “public authority,” litigants whose

172. See id. The outcome in this case must be examined against the background of Article
26. See ECHR, supra note 1, art. 26. Article 26 states: “The Commission may only deal with
the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the
final decision was taken.” Id.
173. See Ben Emmerson, Law: Reporting Restrictions Newspapers Fear that Incorporating
the European Convention on Human Rights into UK Law Will Restrict Investigative Reporting,
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 4, 1997, at 17, available in 1997 WL 14739002; see also Clare Dyer,
Analysis: Privacy: The Media Takes A Shot in the Dark, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 19, 1997,
at 15, available in 1997 WL 14747452.
174. See Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42, cl. 6 (Eng.).
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privacy rights have been infringed would be forced to bring an action
under existing English tort law such as breach of confidence, libel, or
malicious falsehood. Article 8 would give English courts the tools to
bridge a specific gap in the existing legislation and common law
causes of action. It already seems clear that English judges are prepared to apply this right of privacy.175
The British press, as would be expected, did not take well to the
possibility of a new right of privacy being created, and lobbied heavily for a political compromise. Such a compromise was reached, and
the government inserted a special amendment in the Act to safeguard
the rights of a free press.176 Under the amendment, (1) judges are instructed that injunctions preventing publication should not be
granted unless the respondent is present, represented, or “there are
compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified,” 177
and (2) an express provision reminds judges to “have particular regard” to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 “where the
proceedings relate to material which the respondent claims, or which
appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material.”178
If such material is at issue, judges must evaluate whether “the material has, or is about to, become available to the public or it is, or
would be, in the public interest for the material to be published” as
well as take into consideration “any relevant privacy code.”179
This amendment, while lauded by the press, essentially restated
Clause 2 of the Act, which already requires a judge to “take into consideration” the jurisprudence of the European Court. As seen above,
the European Court, in interpreting Article 10, has itself characterized the press as a bastion of democracy whose right to investigate,

175. See Press Freedom, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at 21, available in 1997 WL 1479909
(“[A]s Lord Bingham, the Lord Chief Justice, has remarked, the courts are set on developing a
common law right of privacy, regardless of the convention.”); see also Dyer, supra note 173
(noting that “judges are on course to develop a right of privacy, with or without the Bill”);
Clare Dyer, Courts May Rule On Privacy Rights, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 9. 1997, at 2,
available in 1997 WL 14734021 (Dyer quoted Lord Bingham’s comment that because the courts
were an arm of the state, there would be “a clear duty on the courts to protect privacy. . . .
What is going to have to be confronted is the demarcation of the boundary between privacy
and free speech. I think it is difficult and debatable territory.”).
176. See Human Rights Act cl. 12; Philip Webster & Carol Midgley, Ministers Move to Allay Media Fears on Privacy, TIMES (London), Feb. 17, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL
4819279; see also Free at Last . . . But Now Read the Fine Print, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 18,
1998, at 17, available in 1998 WL 3079493.
177. Human Rights Act cl. 12(3)(b).
178. Id. cl. 12(4).
179. Id. cl. 12(4)(a), (b). The PCC Code is an example of such a code.
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report, and critique should only be abridged in extreme circumstances.180 The purpose of incorporating the ECHR into the domestic
law of the United Kingdom was in part to let British judges participate in the process of deciding questions of fundamental rights.181
Amendments that seek to curb the interpretive powers of British
judges serve only to weaken treaty rights in the United Kingdom at
the expense of British subjects, who, of course, can still go to Strasbourg to litigate those rights.
The status of the PCC after incorporation of the ECHR into the
domestic law of the United Kingdom has raised considerable controversy.182 Since the PCC is a non-governmental organization, it seems
to be beyond the reach of the Act. This conclusion, however, is not
inevitable. Under Clause 3(b) of the Act, a “public authority” also
includes “any person certain of whose functions are functions of a
public nature.”183 The PCC arguably serves a function of a public nature and therefore may well be within the ambit of the Act. If so, the
PCC would have to be in compliance with the ECHR. In that event,
the PCC would be entrusted with the power to balance what is considered to be in “the public interest” and the right of privacy. Courts
would then only step in when the weighing of the balance was poorly
done. But the more serious dilemma posed for the PCC by the
ECHR is that the PCC can hardly be said to be in compliance with
Article 13. This article guarantees everyone whose rights have been
abridged “an effective remedy.”184 Since the PCC cannot award dam180. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 123 (1996); see also De
Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 1 (1998).
181. See Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, supra note 139, ¶1.14. Here Tony
Blair notes “the rights will be brought much more fully into the jurisprudence of the courts
throughout the United Kingdom, and their interpretation will thus be far more subtly and powerfully woven into our law. And there will be another distinct benefit. British judges will be enabled to make a distinctively British contribution to the development of the jurisprudence of
human rights in Europe.” Id.
182. At first Lord Irvine, the current Lord Chancellor, was convinced that the Act did not
reach the PCC. Lord Wakeham, the Chairman of the PCC thought otherwise. Lord Irvine
soon admitted that he was wrong and that the PCC was indeed within the ambit of the Act. See
Robert Shrimsley, Wakeham Hopes His Press Code Will Head Off Privacy Law, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 9, 1997, at 12, available in 1997 WL 2357522; see also Lord Chancellor’s Department, M2 PRESSWIRE, Dec. 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 16293834. Fears that
the PCC would be covered under the Act have prompted talks of exempting “voluntary organizations” from the Act. See Lord Wakeham, Privacy Law Role Would Weaken Press Complaint
Watchdog, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1997, at 20, available in 1997 WL 14801367. The proposed
amendments to the Act discussed above have laid to rest a specific exemption for the PCC.
183. Human Rights Act cl. 3(b).
184. For a good discussion of the Article 13 requirements, see FARRAN, supra note 100, at
303-08. Farran outlines the finding of the European Court in the Silver case. See Silver v.
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ages and has no power of prior restraint, its function can hardly be
reconciled with the Article 13 requirement. Perhaps foreseeing this
dilemma, however, Article 13 was purposefully deleted from the Act
during review in the House of Lords. This means that litigants would
not be able to sue under Article 13 in courts of the United Kingdom.
To invoke its protection, a plaintiff would have to follow the far less
convenient road to Strasbourg. And indeed, even there, a British
plaintiff might find no relief. The Commission’s result in the Spencer
case could be interpreted to mean that the PCC’s system of selfregulation and the Code, coupled with various other statutory and
common law remedies, viewed in their entirety, afford sufficient privacy protection to satisfy the requirements of Article 13. In contrast,
it may be that a European Court faced with an egregious invasion of
privacy would hold that a complaint to the PCC is incompatible with
Article 13. Either way, the PCC is clearly at a crossroads. It must, in
the face of its inadequate remedies, remain under the constant supervision of the British courts—which will lead plaintiffs to bypass its
flimsy mechanism and head straight for the courts—or the PCC must
fight off irrelevancy and restructure itself in such a way that its remedies are more than nugatory.
V. CONCLUSION
The incorporation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights into the laws of the United Kingdom marks the
beginning of a new chapter in British constitutional reform. The
Human Rights Act empowers judges to apply the ECHR and enforce
a broad range of guarantees and remedies that in the past were only
available in Strasbourg.185 Courts in the United Kingdom are given

United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 437 (1983). In Silver, the European Court held
that where the complainant has an “arguable claim” which violates his convention right, he
would have a remedy before a national authority. See id. at 303. Furthermore, the national
authority does not necessarily need to be a court, but if it is not, then that body’s powers and
the guarantees which it affords are relevant in considering whether the remedy it offers is effective. See id. Finally, although there may not be a single remedy which is entirely satisfactory,
the aggregate of remedies provided under domestic law may be considered in evaluating the
requirements of Article 13. See id.
185. See Human Rights Act art. 8. British courts are entitled to award damages for
breaches of ECHR rights. In awarding such damages, the court is to “take into account the
principles applied by the European Court” in awarding compensation, so as to enable Britons
to receive compensation from a domestic court equivalent to the damages they would receive
in Strasbourg. Id. In De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, for example, the European Court
awarded the two journalists over a million Belgian francs. See De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium,
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 59 (1998).
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the task of assessing the delicate balance between Article 8 guarantees and Article 10 freedoms. It would be premature, however, to
conclude that incorporation of the ECHR signals the beginning of a
full-fledged privacy right in the United Kingdom. Such a right of privacy, as the American experience shows, requires a difficult balancing of competing interests.
Moreover, the ECHR guarantees protect only the individual
against the State and not private third parties. In the case of a plaintiff whose privacy has been invaded by the press, a privacy tort in the
United Kingdom could best be achieved through a more elastic application of the breach of confidence remedy or by way of the still obscure Protection from Harassment Act.
One of the great oversights in this debate, however, has undoubtedly been that incorporation will, for the first time in British
history, establish a guaranteed right of free expression for the press.
This now explicit right could, in time, afford a responsible press a
greater degree of protection as well. Incorporation means the press
can now rely in English court on a largely favorable body of Article
10 case law.
Les P. Carnegie

